## **HUMAN VALUES**

Understanding values is understanding being not as a detached observer of the surrounding but one who permanently and primarily estimates its worth. Plato looked at *thymos* as a part of emotional and intellectual energy the inner self ascribes to soul. In the notion he saw forming an essential part of the spiritual immaterial existing perfectly along with "I". In the acceptable and possible *thymos* finds the way to reality, goodness, wisdom of greater elevation and higher form of ability to think. Looking, in  $\Pi o \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon i \alpha$ , at the state of absolute integrity, Plato through dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon points to the supreme protector or trooper under the power of metaphysical sense of *thymos* and an impulse to oppose what inflicts undeserved hurt. Plato returns to the dialogue in which Socrates, enlightening *thymos* through dog or horse loyal to their master and simultaneously unsurmountable obstacle to the master's enemy, asks Glaucon....

άνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἆρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἴτε ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἣ ἄλλο ότιοῦν ζῷον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὖ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος;⁴

Historical data refer to time between 445 BC and 4th century BC. Glaucon, son of Ariston, was an ancient Athenian and elder Plato's brother primarily known as a great conversant with Socrates in the Republic and in the allegory "The Cave." He is also briefly mentioned at the beginning of two of Plato's dialogues, the Parmenides and the Symposium. Sources point to nine dialogues of his extant: The Phidylus; the Euripides; the Amyntichias; the Euthias; the Lysithides; the Aristophanes; the Cephalus; the Anaxiphemus and the Minexenus. According to encyclopedia Britanica Plato has never married and did not have posterity but he had brothers Glaucon, Antiphon and Adeimantus of Collytus. However, both encyclopedia Britannica and Diogenes Laertius confirm that the three brothers had a sister, too. Laertius writes..

τὰ μὲν περὶ Πλάτωνος τοσαῦτα ἦν ἐς τὸ δυνατὸν ἡμῖν συναγαγεῖν, φιλοπόνως διειλήσασι τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ τὰνδρό ς. διεδέξατο δ΄ αὐτὸν Σπεύσιππος Εὐρυμέδοντος Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν μὲν δήμων Μυρρινούσιος, υἰὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐ τοῦ Πωτώνης.

And is a creature likely to be brave who has no spirit, be it a dog, a horse or anything else? Have you never observed how invincible and irresistible is spirit and how its presence makes every soul fearless and unconquerable?

What was said above is the best that we could compile after a diligent examination of authorities. Plato's successor Speusippus, an Athenian and son of Eurymedon and Plato's sister Potone, belonged to the deme of Myrrhinus.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> worth of the surrounding

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ....of thymos

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> the Republic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Πλάτων (1894) "Πολιτεία" in Campbell, L. and Jowett, B. (ed.) *Plato's Republic: the Greek text*, the Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 76

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Diogenes Laertius (1853) "Life of Glaucon" *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Henry G. Bohn, London, pp. 104

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Diogenis Laertii (1964) "Liber IV: ΣΠΕΥΣΙΠΠΟΣ," Vitae Philosophorym, E Typographeo Clarendoniano, Oxford, pp. 164

Socrates writes about Glaucon's wide education pointing out his knowledge of musical theory and harmonious proportions. Glaukon's name shows loyalty to Athens, goddess of wisdom and the deity who guards the city. It is not clear whether the name, given by birth, represents the epithet adoring Athens or nickname seeking sagacity. The use of epithets as names was common at the time and Plato, for instance, is not the name by birth but refers to the philosopher's corpulency. Glaukon along with his brother (name is not mentioned) fought in the battle of Magare that Athenians won 424 B.C. during the peak of the Peloponnesian War against Sparta and the allies. In Πολιτεία Socrates is grateful to both brothers for courage in the battle and the bloodline power. Returning to dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon reveals more of Socrates, Athenian philosopher and one of the most important historical figures in European erudite tradition. Considered one of the founders of Western thought he was an enigmatic figure, known mainly in works of classical writers, especially in the writings of Plato, Xenophon and through performances of his contemporary Aristophanes. Socrates was not in the habit of writing down the thoughts, and only source of his philosophy are works of the contemporaries which is why many saw Socrates as the father of thought of moral values. Socrates' portrait in Plato's dialogues was seen as the resounding contribution to ethics and such a Plato's Socrates lends his name to convictions of Socrates' irony and modus operandi. The latter refers to a negative method of hypothetical elimination, in which more notable hypotheses are reached through unceasing identification and elimination of those leading to circumstances encompassing inconsistent elements (contradictions). This Socrates' method reflects searching for essential hypotheses, assumptions or axioms having the ability of unpremeditated forming a man's opinion in order to determine its consistency with other beliefs. The general form is a series of questions coming into being as tests of logic and facts directed to help an individual or group to discover belief about the same topic exploring so interior meaning of logos or logoi. The purified principle of external benefits and sublimated establishing of moral activity leads to its interior foundation (of moral activity) and selfrefinement of advancing towards the inner goodness. Self-meliorating is the second material principle of Socrates' ethics. Ergo, he says.....

καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν: θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δέ, θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἥ δη; οὐκ οἶσθ΄ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν οὕτε βέλτιον οὕθ΄ ἥδιον ἐμαυτοῦ β εβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλι στα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται.<sup>7</sup>...

## ....because....

ἔοικας, ὧ Αντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι: ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθα ι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶτὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτ ω τοῦ κρατίστου.8

Unusual words, I said and he 'do you think it unusual, if it seems better to the Heavens that I should rest with God now? Do you not understand that to this day I never would acknowledge that any human being lived a better or a more pleasant life than I? For they live best, I believe, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the most pleasant life is of those who are conscious that their goodness is growing.

It seems, Atiphon, you imagine that fortune consists in luxury and immoderate spending. However, I believe that having no wants is divine; having as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is closest to the supreme.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Xenophontis (1858) *Opera Omnia*, Volume II, Gothae er Erfordlae, Londini pp. 499-500

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Xenophontis (1858) opere citato, pp. 164

Evil is not an absolute reality or its independent agent, but a consequence of the imperfection of human nature. Traces of such understanding are found in Plato's works and Socrates in his Apology spiritual and moral self-meliorating places on the pedestal of his living work...

άλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων ἀποθανῆ' — εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶτούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ'ὅτι ' ἐγὰ ὑμᾶς, ἆ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶός τε ὧ, οὺ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶ ν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῷ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἶάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι 'ὧ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Άθηναῖος ὄν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὺκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, 10

Different individuals, groups, nations and cultures differently approach what is being valued. As the classical theory asserts – every human being is, simultaneously, like all other people, like some of them and like no one. Absolutely, in concurrence with this, similarity or pancultural values striving - values having the same marks across the world, often point out that variations are what defines primarily quantity before quality while similarities prevail over differences. Virtues<sup>11</sup> differ in the inner essence of details as, for instance, how a samurai understands bravery differs from how Plato sees courage; benevolence in Confucius' vision is not how Aguinas defines caritas. Apart from that the traditions have respectively unique virtues (such as the ability for inventive thought and understanding in Aristotle or thrift in Franklin) but the mutual understanding is not metaphysical for those brought up as ethical relativists pretty worthy of attention. This reveals the meaning of the assertion that men are moral animals. 12 Like virtue, value is not only an abstract idea or principle referring to what is always characterized by the presence rather than the absence of distinguishing features; by definition human striving can be defined in a similar way. Fundamentally, the good-natured vision of everyone of us researches of values outline contains essential metaphysical and practical implications. In every human being in the early childhood rests innate instinct - achieving values of truth, values of what pleases the aesthetic senses and values of moral rightness. Human life cannot be understood without knowing the meaning of the inner senses and speech of soul – the most beautiful and the most powerful ability of expressing thoughts and emotions. Growing, transfer of possibility into what in reality exists, striving for physical, emotional and mental well-being, identity, autonomy and longing for perfection deserve to be unconditionally accepted as ubiquitous and perhaps universal hoping. The essence rests in values giving birth to possibility of seeing human being as active, self-conscious and being who does apprehend sensible goals.

<sup>9</sup> Plato's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Steadman, G. (2020) *Plato's Apology: Greek Text with Facing Vocabulary and Commentary*, Geoffrey Steadman, pp. 54-55

if you would let me go on this condition that I pointed to, I should tell you 'Men of Athens I admire and love you, but I will rather obey the heavens and while I am alive and able to move forward, I will never give up philosophy or stop encouraging you and stressing the true to anyone of you whom I may meet, saying as I usually do – Most excellent man, art thou who is a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most renowned for wisdom and might not conscience-stricken to care for the acquiring prosperity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Spirituality, wisdom, courage, justice, knowledge, love, humanity

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Seligman, M. (2002) "Part II: Strength and Virtue – Renewing Strength and Virtue," *Authentic Happines: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, The Free Press, New York, pp. 133

Fairness is what connects moral principles that govern human behaviour and politics. The notion is everything related to a system, an individual and their soul or the state and its organization and fairness is also when the system works well. On the other side, the concept of value refers to interests, pleasures, preferences and moral duties. Some schools of thought stress that the concept could not be fully understood without apprehending desires, needs, aversions and attractions or other forms of selective orientations while Pepper asserts that "...in the broadest sense anything good or bad is a value." Returning to moral principles in human behaviour Socrates in Πολιτεία, denies that fairness is speaking of truth or returning to others what belongs to them. He also disagrees that the impartial and just within the notion is what belongs to the more powerful or that fair individual always loses while the unfair always gains. Although social psychology primarily looks at the notion of value as the subjective one it is indeed a must to stress that values are simultaneously permeated with inclinations towards a particular behaviour characterizing<sup>14</sup> certain historical timeframe, social system and the striving. Values undoubtedly portray not only one of the most important concepts in a series of the related scientific disciplines but refer to where, for instance, philosophy, anthropology, sociology and psychology intertwine. All this offers insight into comprehensive overview of social phenomena complexity as well as instigating interdisciplinary researches attempting to clarify social organization, interpersonal relations or social forming a united whole.

Meaning of value appears as characteristic or characteristics of an object being evaluated (e.g. its price). Determination of the notion appears also as what is being 'measured' and has significant importance. However, what is of importance does not have to be always objective or undoubtedly established as different people could ascribe significance to different entities, with distinct objective value which having in mind such a sense could refer to anything one is interested in. This apprehension of value would not, by definition, point to a characteristic of an object being evaluated but subject ascribing significance to something or assessing it. Justice is a matter of convention having in mind where the first theory of the social contract appears, although in an insufficiently developed expression. Glaucon does not seem to be far from Hobes since he asserts that the political community was created to enable people's surviving, protecting from unfair nature and avoiding the greatest evil in form of injustice. On the other hand, Plato also believes that the political community is created in form enabling ability of its beings to survive, however not protecting one from another, but satisfying their various wants due to the gap existing between human needs and human abilities. This is where analogy appears as Socrates does want to help value in form of justice.....

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Pepper, S. C. (1970) "The Setting of the Problem: The Problem of value and the Field of Study," *The Sources of Value*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, pp.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Inclinations is what characterize....

ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἐγὼ μὲν αὖ ἐν νῷ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, οὕ τί που οἴει, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον. αὐτό, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη: ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἰκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη. καὶ ὅς, οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις: ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε. δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν, οι δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵν' ἦ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε ὑέσιν, καὶ πάντες οί<sup>15</sup>

Within the economy, for instance, and in the works of authors such as Adam Smith value is conceptualized as currency, as the value of an object in the literal sense; how many people, say, would be willing to work for something or pay for it. Immanuel Kant and other philosophers of moral value used the term in somewhat broader sense in what surrounds the question....what is good? or What is a good way of living in this world? It is, in real understanding, not that far from the current apprehension of the concept<sup>16</sup> within sociology and social psychology looking at values as motivational constructs that shape elections understood as shared beliefs about ideals of transcedental significance. This is, indeed, related to existing or nonexisting impersonal, eternal values, something that is just permanent and everywhere, or is it always something being good for only some. However, what all viewpoints have in common seems to be emphasis on the importance of something. Each approach is interested in how and through what mechanisms humans find out what is important to them. The essential common point is, in fact, the process of valuing and assigning importance and that process refers not only to expressing affection towards an entity but considering it fair and associate in some way with the value it expresses. Values also understand phenomena 'deserving' to be seen as a value.

Having in mind influential theses within philosophy the so-called *fitting attitude* value analysis, an object is valuable if, an only if, it is appropriate to be preferred or as Deona and Teroni point out, to evoke appropriate emotions. In other words, having a positive attitude is appropriate if such a veiwpoint could be portrrayed as an expression of the participative and prescriptive and if the attitude is materialized as valuable to the extent that the process of such an evaluative materialization is appropriate. Socrates' desire to help and defend value is nothing more but his primal drive to portray value in its true form. Analogy is, in a way, an argument that Socrates will use to refute (or try to refute) all the stated determinations of fairness. Nevertheless, he directing the analogy against Thrasymachus and Glaucon wants to show that justice is good, pays off and benefits all, responding so to Thrasymachus (justice benefits only the stronger), as he<sup>17</sup> claims in his first definition. Socrates, further asserts that justice is good both in itself and in its consequences opposing so Glaucon's testimony that justice is good due to the good consequences.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> <u>Πλάτων</u> (1894) "<u>Πολιτεία,</u>" *opere citato*, pp. 56-57

to make understanding thereto, however his brother Adeimantus responded 'You certainly do not assume, Socrates, that the statement of the case is thorough?' I added 'What for...what more?' He said 'the paramount point was not spoken about' but I asserted 'as the saying has it, *let a brother help a man*, - and so if Glaucon omits any word or deed would you assist him. However, what he has already mentioned is sufficient to overthorow and incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice.' He responded that it has nosense and continued 'but listen to this further point. We should explain reasoning and language of the opposite party, of those who praise justice and criticize injustice, if what I conceive to be Glaucon's meaning is to be made more apprehensible., Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all having others in their charge.

<sup>16 ...</sup>of value

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Thrasymachus

The approach, in which Socrates' will to help and defend value is clearly notable, would however imply that the object<sup>18</sup> does deserve such a reaction due to some of its properties which would, further, imply that values are objective and independent of the human real relation towards the object being valued.

For instance, an attitude believes in existence of different domains of characteristics corresponding with different senses just as humans, by touch, react to the texture of an object or with emotions to the evaluative properties of an object. It is often understood that sensations are, in fact, perception of what is valuable in ontological sense. The emotion of anger that, for example, arises as a reaction to an experience of injustice is, in a way, its correct perception. For an individual having developed moral values and unshakable moral direction emotional perceptions take the form of a reliable ground of moral judgments. Exchanging opinions with Adeimantus on what makes justice and what injustice is made up of Socrates refers to its core which, it seemed to him, requested not weak but clear eyesight.

He further believed that they were not able to fulfil this primary prerequisite looking like shortsighted people given lower cases to read from afar. It occurs to some that the same lower cases at some other place are more notable and written on more notable board, so they are sufficiently intelligent to, in the first place, recognize the cases at both places and compare them to see whether they are of the same size. What happens then is, indeed the most interesting part of the discussion.....

<sup>18</sup> The term is used in the most general sense

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> perception of injustice

.... ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἐνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; πάνυ γε, ἦ δ΄ ὅς. οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ένὸς ἀνδρός; μεῖζον, ἔφη. ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν: ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ένὶ ἐκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν. ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὶ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγω, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; τάχ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς. οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπὶς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν; πολύ γε. δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι: σκοπεῖτε οὖν. ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος: άλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγὧμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, άλλὰ πολλῶν ὢν ἐνδεής: ἢ τίν' οἴει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ' ὅς.οὕτω δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων άλλος ἄλλον, ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρείᾳ, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνούς τε καὶ βοηθούς, ταύτη τῆ συνοικία ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα: ἦ γάρ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλφ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι; πάνυ γε. ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῷμεν πόλιν: ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία. πῶς δ΄ οὕ; ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφής παρασκευή τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἕνεκα. παντάπασί γε. δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔστι ταῦτα. φέρε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἶς, ό δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμον αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῷμα θεραπευτήν; πάνυ γε. εἴη δ' ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἣ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. φαίνεται. τί δὴ οὖν; ἕνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἄπασι κοινὸν κατατιθέναι, οἶον τὸν γεωργὸν ἕνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσιν καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευἢ καὶ ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν, ἣ άμελήσαντα έαυτῷ μόνον τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ σίτου ἐν τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν έπὶ τῆ τῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῆ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἰματίου, τὸ δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αύτὸν τὰ αύτοῦ πράττειν; καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη: ἀλλ' ἴσως, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾳٓον ἣ 'κείνως. οὐδέν, ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ, μὰ Δία ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὄμοιος ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ἔμοιγε.<sup>20</sup>

Mr Leo Fay of Michael J. Kennedy Solicitors, perhaps, will have a wish to reflect about what the moral philosophers had in mind.

We believe that justice is a quality living in a whole community and simultaneously in an individual who is lower of the two. Probably we then could look for and find justice there in larger proportions, easier to make out. If you

<sup>20</sup> <u>Πλάτων</u> (1894) "<u>Πολιτεία,</u>" opere citato, pp. 65-68

wish let us have a look, first, what justice refers to in states then we will see what it looks like at individuals. We will also look for similarities between the larger and the smaller justice. I believe you wisely speak he [Adeimantus] responded. Could we apprehend how justice and injustice come into being when in our thoughts we would observe origination of the state? Of course, we could. Can we hope that we will find easier what we are looking for having seen how the state came into being? Much easier. Shall we attempt, then, to do that task? I think it is not light undertaking. Have a second thought. We thought two times, said Adeimantus. Do not waste any more time. I started: I think that the state originates because none of us is self-sufficient and we all have many needs. Perhaps you believe that some different origin for the foundation of a community exists? No, I do not believe it... I agree with you. Ergo, having in mind all these needs we call in each other's assistance to help satisfy our different requirements and when we have a number of helpers and assistants to live together in one place we see the settlement as a state. Do you agree. I do. So, if an individual gives another what he should give in exchange for what he can get it is because each f them understands that to do so is for his own advantage. Of course, I do agree, I said. Let us visualize our imaginary state from the beginning. Obviously it owes its living to our needs of which the first and the most important is provision of food enabling our living. Then we need a house and clothing. That is true. In which way our state could supply all these demands? Somebody of us will need to be a farmer, another a builder and somebody should be a weaver. Will that satisfy the need or we might think of a shoemaker and one or two more to provide for what we need? Certainly. That small state will, then, consist of several people. Obviously. There is more. Should each one of them bring what he produces into a common stock? Should one of them, farmer for instance, provide food that would satisfy needs of four people and spend all his working time producing corn which then he would share with others? Should he pay no attention to them and spend only a

quarter of his time on growing what would satisfy only himself dividing the other three quarters between building a house, waving clothes and making shoes for himself so as to save the trouble of sharing with others and attend himself to all his own concerns? What you thought of in the first place might be easier, said Adeimantus. In the name of Zeus, that is so natural. While you were speaking it occurred to me that no two people resemble one another. The innate differences explain why they are fit for different occupations. Do you not think so? I do.